Tag Archive: Family Guy


In the Family Guy episode “Baby, You Knock Me Out“, Glen Quagmire gives Peter Griffin tickets to a foxy boxing event for his birthday.  When Peter, his wife Lois, and friends go to the event the ring announcer invites someone from the crowd to enter the ring and compete. Unbeknownst to Lois, Peter volunteers her to fight.  Initially Lois is unwilling to compete, but eventually she bows to peer pressure.  Surprisingly, Lois not only survives the match but actually annihilates her opponent after mentally substituting Peter’s face for her opponent’s.   Afterward, Peter attempts to convince Lois to become a professional boxer so that she can leverage her new found talent.  In actuality, Peter simply wants to benefit by becoming Lois’ fight promoter.  Initially Lois resists Peter’s suggestion, but after a brief morning exchange with Peter in the living room she agrees.

Peter:   You will recall last night ere I drifted off into slumber, with a nudie magazine betwixt my legs, I spake thusly: “Lois, tomorrow morning, I want flapjacks.” It was a simple message, yet it has gone unheeded.

Lois:    [Growl]…All right Peter, give me a minute.

Peter:   For every 5 seconds I don’t have flapjacks, I will break one window.

[About a minute later]   This is crazy.  Is nobody really making me flapjacks yet?

In recent years women’s sports have risen from obscurity as female athletes are given the opportunity to develop their athletic talents at all educational levels.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, a federal law enacted on June 23, 1972, is largely responsible for this rise of women’s sports.  Interestingly enough while Title IX is now closely associated with women’s athletics at universities there was little discussion of athletics during congressional hearings prior to its enactment.  Title IX was originally intended to address sexual discrimination against students and employees of educational institutions receiving federal funds.  However, the most visible applications of Title IX have been in university athletic programs; therefore, they have received the most attention.

In reality, Title IX affects every aspect of education at the educational institutions covered by the law.  For example, it requires such institutions to provide equal access to all academic courses offered, comparable facilities for men and women, and equal financial assistance.  Furthermore, the institutions are required by Title IX to evaluate their extracurricular programs every two years in order to ensure compliance.  However, Title IX explicitly exempted a public college with traditional and continuing single-sex admissions policy and single-sex military schools.  The U.S. Supreme Court later judicially eliminated that statutory exemption.

In United States v. Virginia, the U.S. Attorney General sued the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) to challenge the VMI’s all-male admissions policy.  Since Title IX exempted single-sex military schools, the United States brought suit under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act as a violation of the U.S. Constitution.  The United States claimed that by excluding women from a state-supported college, VMI was violating the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.  The federal district court that originally heard the case had ruled in favor of VMI.  In its decision, the district court noted that a “separate but equal” institution had already been flatly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in its earlier civil rights cases.  However, since the Commonwealth of Virginia had provided a “parallel program” when it created the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), located at Mary Baldwin College, VMI’s policy was constitutional.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit which had suggested the “parallel program” standard in a previous ruling affirmed the district court.

The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts on the grounds that unless VMI’s justification was “exceedingly persuasive” then its gender-based discrimination was unconstitutional.  In order to demonstrate a justification is “exceedingly persuasive” a defendant must show that (1) the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives, and (2) the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.  Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her majority opinion that even if the Court accepted a parallel program standard, VWIL did not even meet that standard.  For example while VMI offered numerous NCAA competition level athletic facilities, like a large boxing facility, VWIL only had two multi-purpose fields and one gymnasium.  VMI attempted to demonstrate that its gender-based admissions policy supported a Virginia policy of providing diverse higher educational opportunities.  VMI proposed a requirement of admitting women would destroy the unique educational opportunity provided by its single-sex program.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected VMI’s proposition noting the school had successfully managed another notable change when it admitted its first African-American cadets in 1968.  The Court noted that VMI was not only denying women the primary benefit of a VMI education by excluding them.  The exclusion of women also denied the secondary political and economic benefits provided VMI’s strong alumni network.

Boxing offers Lois the secondary benefit of providing a means to release her frustrations over Peter along with the primary benefits of physical exercise.  Similarly, Title IX provides women substantial secondary benefits above the primary benefits of greater opportunity in collegiate sports.  Statistics generated by the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education demonstrate the dramatic effect Title IX has had on the number of post-secondary degrees earned by women.  Prior to the 1972 adoption of Title IX, a higher number of men earned post-secondary degrees with a widening gap between genders.  Between the 1972 adoption and 1978 compliance date of Title IX, that trend reversed.  Considering all the benefits a college degree provides, Title IX certainly provides women with significant secondary benefits.

Stewie Griffin’s  first trick or treating” experience takes a sinister turn in the “Halloween on Spooner Street” episode of  Family Guy, which aired Sunday November 7, 2010 at 9/8c.  When Stewie (voice, Seth MacFarlane) ventures out of the house escorted by Brian (voice, Seth MacFarlane), the night looks promising. Stewie is pleased with his “vampire” duck costume, and becomes even more excited as his pillow case is filled with candy.

However, Brian’s momentary lapse changes the course of the evening. Brian believes he sees his nemesis, the dog that lives in the Griffins’ patio door (actually his reflection), in the hubcap of a parked car. He briefly leaves Stewie unattended to place a note on the car to alert the owner to the presence of the “jerk” dog.  During Brian’s absence, Stewie is confronted by 3 older bullies who steal his Halloween candy. When Brian attempts to get Stewie’s candy back from the boys, they spray-paint him pink. Thoroughly angered and humiliated, Brian and Stewie conspire to kill the 3 troublemakers.

In furtherance of their plot, Stewie and Brian somehow obtain a rocket launcher and sneak over to the yard where the boys are enjoying their spoils. Brian gives Stewie a boost up onto a nearby roof where he makes his stand, yelling at the boys and pointing the rocket launcher at them menacingly. One of the boys throws a rock at Stewie, causing him to lose his balance and tumble off the roof. As he hits the ground, the rocket launcher goes off accidentally. Although the rocket misses the 3 boys, it does connect with Godzilla far off in the distance, finally liberating the world from his reign of terror. 

A criminal conspiracy “exists when two or more people agree to commit almost any unlawful act, then take some action toward its completion. The action taken need not itself be a crime, but it must indicate that those involved in the conspiracy knew of the plan and intended to break the law. One person may be charged with and convicted of both conspiracy and the underlying crime based on the same circumstances.”

Although the crime was thwarted, the conspiracy is complete. The two acts of getting the rocket launcher and going to the boys’ hideout would easily satisfy the requirement of  “some action taken toward completion of the crime.” In addition, when Stewie progressed past mere preparation to the initial steps of crime commission, this would constitute criminal attempt, which is defined as “the crime of having the intent to commit and taking action in an effort to commit a crime that fails or is prevented. There is no settled answer to how close to completing a crime a person must be to be guilty of attempt, but attempt must generally consist of more than preparation.”

Because the Griffins live in Rhode Island, the criminal statutes of that state would control. RI ST § 11-1-6 (1956) on conspiracy states:

Except as otherwise provided by law, every person who shall conspire with another to commit an offense punishable under the laws of this state shall be subject to the same fine and imprisonment as pertain to the offense which the person shall have conspired to commit, provided that imprisonment for the conspiracy shall not exceed ten (10) years.

 In addition, RI ST 12-17-14 on attempt states:

Whenever any person is tried upon an indictment, information, or complaint and the court or jury, as the case may be, shall not be satisfied that he or she is guilty of the whole offense, but shall be satisfied that he or she is guilty of so much of the offense as shall substantially amount to an offense of a lower nature, or that the defendant did not complete the offense charged, but that he or she was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same offense, the court or jury may find him or her guilty of the lower offense or guilty of an attempt to commit the offense, as the case may be, and the court shall proceed to sentence the person for the offense of which he or she shall be so found guilty, notwithstanding that the court had not otherwise jurisdiction of the offense.

Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in Snell v. United States, held that a defendant may be charged with and convicted for both the crimes of conspiracy and attempt (450 U.S. 957 (1981)). For a decision b the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that reaches the same decision, click here. Because both courts hold that the act of one conspirator is the act of all, Brian would be held liable for even those acts committed by Stewie to commit the actual crime. Also, these holdings indicate that Stewie and Brian can be charged with and convicted for both conspiracy and attempt. Finally, according to Rhode Island state law, the two cohorts may be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 10 years for conspiracy to commit murder and an additional sentence for the attempted murder itself. This is quite a high price to pay for a pillow case full of Halloween candy. Of course, while Stewie and Brian could potentially be sent “up the river” for conspiracy in the Family Guy universe, no such conspiracy would be recognized in the real world. After all, a baby cannot conspire with a dog to commit a crime!

Peter Griffin discovered his wealthy father-in-law Carter Pewterschmidt is having an affair in the “Welcome Back, Carter” episode of Family Guy.  Initially Peter keeps the discovery to himself because of a promise he made to Carter.  This understandably made for an exceptionally awkward meal with his in-laws shortly afterwards.  However, when he discussed it with his friends at the Drunken Clam Bar, they suggested he should capitalize on his new leverage over Carter.  Since Carter always treats Peter poorly, it didn’t take much to persuade Peter it was a good idea.  Emboldened by the realization he has Carter in a precarious position, Peter confronts Carter.  In exchange for not telling Carter’s wife what he witnessed, Peter demanded that Carter “do a lot of stuff for him.”  Carter concedes to Peter’s demand and  does what Peter says through the episode like use his limos for jousting and giving Peter his television.  Unfortunately, for Peter these are both criminal offense in all states.

The name for the chargeable offense associated with this crime depends on which jurisdiction Peter is located in when he commits it.  For example, if Peter committed this act in Rhode Island where the Griffin family resides, he may be charged with “Extortion” and “Blackmail” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-2. However, if the crime was committed in Kansas, Peter may be charged with “Blackmail” under Kan. Stat. § 21-3428.  Furthermore, if the jurisdiction was Louisiana, he may be charged with “Extortion” under La. Rev. Stat. § 14:66.  In the end does the name of the chargeable offense even matter?

While this may seem to be only a matter of semantics, it is a question that has made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  In United States v. Nardello, the defendants lured prominent businessmen into a compromising homosexual situation and then threatened to expose the behavior unless payment was made.  Since the defendants crossed over state lines on numerous occasions while perpetrating this crime they were indicted with violations of the Travel Act.  The Travel Act makes it illegal to travel interstate with the intent to carry on any unlawful activity and thereafter perform (or attempt to) extortion in violation of a State law.  However, since Pennsylvania distinguished between “Extortion” and “Blackmail,” by requiring the defendant to be a public official in order to be guilty of “Extortion,” the district court dismissed the indictments.

The U.S. Supreme Court looked to the common law definition of Extortion.  It found, “at common law a public official who under color of office obtained the property of another not due either to the office or the official was guilty of extortion.”  Next, the Court noted how many States had expanded the crime to include acts by private individuals and in doing so applied different terminology to the crime.  It even found that “[a]t least one State does not denominate any specific act as extortion but prohibits appellees’ type of activities under the general heading of offenses directed against property.”  To resolve the issue, the Court looked to what actions Congress had intended to prohibit when passing the Travel Act.  It found the underlying activity the defendants were charged with equated to the actions Congress wished to curb.  Therefore, the Court reasoned it would frustrate Congress’ efforts to permit the charges to be dropped just because the particular State referred to the crime as something else.  After all, if the Travel Act was interpreted by the plain text, two defendants charged with the same federal crime for the same act would get differing results.  One of the defendants could go free while the other went to jail just because they were caught in two different states.  Thus, the Court interpreted the term Extortion in the Travel Act meant Extortion, Blackmail, and any other State crime as long as the underlying conduct was the same.

This doesn’t necessarily mean the same result will always occur.  Even today over forty years after Nardello there are many who distinguish between Blackmail and Extortion for different reasons.  One­­­­ legal scholar describes the difference between them as “[b]lackmail can only be an offer, not a threat; extortion can be only the latter.”  Another legal scholar describes the difference as “whereas extortion can potentially involve a threat to do anything that is deemed to be wrongful, blackmail involves one particular kind of threat—namely, to expose information that would be embarrassing to the one threatened.”  Furthermore a criminal defense attorney says “[t]he difference is that extortion requires an independent criminal act, and blackmail does not.”  As many legal issues are resolved by interpretation of word choice, this may be a subtle distinction to keep in mind.